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The contributions in this Forum have addressed many ‘big issues’ about EU 
citizenship, but have paid much less attention to the ‘catalogue’ of sugges-
tions Ferrera has made in order to “add stuff” to EU citizenship and to make 
it more visible and salient. I would like to focus on these proposals, all going 
in the direction of strengthening the social dimension of integration. As 
widely acknowledged in the literature, social policy institutions have his-
torically served key political functions for state and nation building pur-
poses in Western countries,1 including in federal systems, where social 
citizenship – as noted also by Seeleib-Kaiser in this volume – has been used 
as an element to foster unity.2 Within the EU’s multi-level framework, the 
possibility to exploit the legitimating and credit claiming potential of supra-
national social programmes for polity- building and maintenance is under-
mined by two elements: on the one hand, the small size of the EU social 
budget and, on the other hand, the indirect way of functioning of suprana-
tional programmes that makes EU measures and funds scarcely visible to 
citizens.
According to the 2017 Flash Eurobarometer on Citizens’ awareness and 
perceptions of EU regional policy,3 EU actions to promote social and eco-
nomic development are largely unknown to respondents, with more than 63 
1 Cf. Flora, P. (1999), ‘Introduction and Interpretation’, in P. Flora, S. Kuhnle & 
D. Urwin (eds.), State Formation, Nation-Building and Mass Politics in 
Europe: The Theory of Stein Rokkan, 1–91. Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press.
2 Obinger, H., S. Leibfried & F. G. Castles (eds.) (2005), Federalism and the 
Welfare State: New World and European Experiences. Cambridge, U.K.: 
Cambridge University Press.
3 Eurobarometer (2017), Flash Eurobarometer 452. Report: Citizens’ awareness 
and perceptions of EU regional policy, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/
DocumentKy/79239.
This text has been written in the context of the RESCEU Project (Reconciling 
economic and social Europe), www.resceu.eu), funded by the European Research 
Council (Advanced Grant no. 340534).
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per cent never having heard of any EU co-financed project to improve the 
area they live in.4 The average value however conceals significant variation 
across countries: if 80 per cent of respondents have heard about EU’s 
regional support in Poland, the share drops to 40 per cent in Italy, 27 per cent 
in France and 25 per cent in Germany, sinking to a modest 16 per sent in 
Austria and 14 per cent in Denmark5.
These figures somehow confirm that little credit goes to the EU directly 
for its own efforts and spending in the social sphere. This does not come as 
a surprise. A broad strand of implementation studies has documented how 
the translation of higher level policies and goals into street-level actions is 
subject to a ‘variety of disjunctive influences’.6 This issue becomes even 
more relevant in federal and multi-level polities, in which higher-level poli-
cies are more at risk of getting unravelled at the frontlines,7 as street-level 
providers are not direct arms of the supranational level. The so-called last 
mile problem (the final link of the implementation chain) has a political 
dimension as well. The level of government/political authority that controls 
the last mile has an incentive to “capture” as much political credit as possi-
ble, even if resources (legal and/or financial) come from higher levels.
Some of the proposals suggested by Ferrera would work as antidotes 
against this syndrome, enhancing the EU’s visibility for end-recipients at the 
terminal phase of the implementation chain. The current situation is more 
advanced on this front than Ferrera acknowledges. EU institutions (espe-
cially the European Commission) are aware of the last mile problem and 
have in fact already made several attempts to foster the visibility of EU’s 
4 Regional policy is endowed with 351.8 billion euros and accounts for approxi-
mately a third of the EU budget for the current 2014–2020 budget cycle. It 
co-finances (primarily through the ESF, the ERDF and the Cohesion fund) 
projects to promote job creation, competitiveness, economic growth and 
citizens’ quality of life.
5 These findings partly reflect the diverse relevance and size of EU financing 
across countries, but still there is no strong correlation between level of 
awareness and per-capita EU funding.
6 Cf. May, P. J. & S. C. Winter (2007), ‘Politicians, Managers, and Street-Level 
Bureaucrats: Influences on Policy Implementation’ Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 19 (3): 453–476 (p. 454).
7 Cf. Keiser, L. R. (2001), ‘Street-Level Bureaucrats, Administrative Power and 
the Manipulation of Federal Social Security Disability Programs’, State 
Politics & Policy Quarterly 1 (2): 144–164.
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action at the points of actual delivery. I will illustrate this with the example 
of the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD), a new EU 
social program that was launched in March 2014 with the aim of confront-
ing the most severe forms of material deprivation by providing non-financial 
assistance to the most needy.
The FEAD, in brief
The assistance provided by the FEAD takes primarily the form of food, 
clothing and other essential stuff, accompanied by advice and counsel-
ling to help beneficiaries to re-integrate into society. The FEAD may 
also finance stand-alone social inclusion activities, which are designed 
to strengthen most deprived people’s skills and capacities to help them 
overcome the situation of difficulty they face.8
Participation in the programme on the side of member states is 
mandatory and its governance model rests on a multi-level approach. 
Member states are required to prepare national Operation Programmes 
(OP), illustrating the domestic strategy for implementing the Fund 
during the 2014–2020 period. They can opt for two different OP types: 
OP I – covering primarily food aid and basic material assistance, com-
plemented by social inclusion measures; and OP II – dedicated to 
stand-alone social inclusion measures.
Overall, the programme was endowed with 3.8 billion euros from 
the EU budget. In addition, member states have to top up the allocation 
through national co-financing.9
Despite the steering role played by European and national manag-
ing authorities in the management of the programme, the actual imple-
mentation of the measures at the street level primarily relies on partner 
organisations, i.e. civil society organisations such as food-banks and 
charities, that are in charge of the actual distribution of assistance and 
the provision of social inclusion measures.
8 See European Commission (2015), The Fund for European Aid to the Most 
Deprived (FEAD) – Breaking the vicious circle of poverty and deprivation. 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.
9 The minimum co-financing rate is set at 15 per cent of eligible public expendi-
tures, but it can be reduced up to 0 per cent for member states with temporary 
budgetary difficulties.
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In the context of this Forum’s discussion, the FEAD experience is inter-
esting in two main respects. First, the FEAD Regulation10 details a number 
of requirements that, at the very end of the implementation chain, street- 
level providers have to comply with. These include the requests that ‘during 
the implementation of an operation, the beneficiaries of funding and partner 
organisations shall inform the public about the support obtained from the 
Fund by placing either at least one poster with information about the opera-
tion (minimum size A3), including about the financial support from the 
Union or a Union emblem of reasonable size, at a location readily visible to 
the public. This requirement shall be fulfilled, without stigmatising end- 
recipients, at each place of delivery’; and ‘any document, including any 
attendance or other certificate, concerning an operation shall include a state-
ment to the effect that the operational programme was supported by the 
Fund.’11 This is a relatively explicit strategy precisely aimed at claiming 
some symbolic and thus political credit at the end of the last mile.
Second, the European Commission has made special efforts to strengthen 
awareness, as well as its reach over front-line partners, by financing the cre-
ation of a community of stakeholders, grouping together EU-level NGOs 
and EU institutions, partner organisations – in addition to national managing 
authorities. Within the activities of the FEAD Network, the European 
Commission organises face-to-face meetings and has created a social media 
platform to boost virtual interactions. In this case, the political goal is not 
only credit claiming, but more ambitiously that of establishing direct links 
between the supranational level and the social and ‘civic’ grass roots.
How compliant are local authorities and delivering agencies with these 
new regulatory provisions? How effective are they in raising awareness, 
enhancing visibility, generating symbolic credit? We do not have any empir-
ical answer yet, these are, however, very relevant and intriguing questions 
for future research.
 An EU Social Card?
Introducing an ‘EU Social Card’ aimed at easing citizen access to services, 
as envisaged by Ferrera, could be another promising strategy. It would be a 
small riforma col cacciavite (to use an Italian metaphor: a simple fix made 
10 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council no. 223 /2014.
11 Art. 19 of the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council no. 
223 /2014.
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with a screwdriver, with limited cost and high effectiveness) to make the 
social dimension of EU citizenship more visible and tangible. The EU has 
already introduced a European Health Insurance Card (EHIC), which enti-
tles to medical treatment – on a par with nationals – in health emergencies 
as well as for pre-existing conditions while travelling through Europe. In 
February 2016, a pilot project for an EU Disability Card has been launched 
and it is meant to enable mutual recognition of disability status between EU 
Member States, making it easier for persons with disabilities to travel to 
other EU countries. There is also a European Professional Card, aimed at 
simplifying professional qualification recognition procedures for workers 
moving to other EU countries.12
These three initiatives provide tangible benefits only if there is a cross- 
border element – in Ferrera’s terminology they are isopolitical instrumental 
facilitators. Ferrera rightly highlights, however, the need to empower and 
make more visible the stakes of European citizenship also for the stayers. 
Many contributions to this Forum have addressed Ferrera’s proposals from 
a normative perspective. Some have raised doubts about the very fact that 
stayers may bear material burdens in the wake of mobility. The essential 
point, however, is that stayers – especially if low-educated and low-skilled – 
do think/feel (it is both a belief and an emotional reaction) that they indeed 
suffer some penalty. These beliefs/feelings may be normatively or factually 
unwarranted. But they exist, as profusely documented by empirical research. 
And they are politically relevant facts, closely linked with the rise of 
Euroscepticism. I agree with Ferrera that it would be politically sensible to 
de-activate the disruptive potential of these orientations through some EU 
programme dedicated to (or including) those citizens who, for any reason, 
do not exercise free movement and risk to find themselves in a situation of 
economic difficulty. Again, the EU is already moving in this direction, with 
a novel initiative aimed at addressing the up-skilling of low-qualified peo-
ple.13 The programme targets adults with weaknesses in basic skills, knowl-
edge and competences, who therefore are more likely to face a higher risk of 
unemployment, a higher incidence of poverty and social exclusion. In 2016 
there were 63 million people – almost a quarter of the Union population 
12 See European Commission (2017), EU Citizenship Report, available at http://
ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=40723.
13 Cf. Council Recommendation of 19 December 2016 on Upskilling Pathways: 
New Opportunities for Adults, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con-
tent/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:JOC_2016_484_R_0001.
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aged 25–64 – with at most lower secondary education. A Skills Guarantee, 
the official name of the Commission’s proposal,14 could really kill three 
birds with one stone: providing a concrete support to the most vulnerable 
(normative rationale), making the EU economy more competitive via an 
enhanced human capital (functional rationale), and bringing the stayers 
closer to (i.e. more loyal and supportive of) the European Union as such: a 
political rationale well worth pursuing.
14 European Commission (2016), A New Skills Agenda For Europe, COM(2016) 
381 final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?
uri=CELEX:52016DC0381&from=EN.
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